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1 In a nutshell 
Since the 1990ties, international development agencies have been supporting the 
formation and running of microfinance associations throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Leading development partners are among others GTZ, HIVOS, World Women Banking, 
UNDP, IFAD and DFID. Their contributions to MF umbrella budgets rank from 45% in 
Ivory Coast to over 80% e. g. in Ethiopia and Uganda (SEEP 2004). 
There are manifold reasons for microfinance association; the most common ones are 
advocacy, information, capacity building. However, the one unifying rationale of this 
organisational type appears to be wanting. The following paper makes two cases about 
the rationale of MF associations: 
1. MF associations should NOT be regulatory bodies. In Uganda and elsewhere, there is 
a tendency to transform associations into apexes, to use them for regulation tasks. 
This is based on two motives: On the one hand, due to under-conceptualisation of 
associations, their promoters tend to see a promising opportunity in some regulatory 
role; its impact is often not well understood or neglected. On the other hand, some 
government agencies that lack resources and reliable systems for fulfilling regulatory 
tasks tend to see apexes as a convenient "quick fix." 
2. The competitive edge of MF associations lies in improving informational efficiency 
of the Microfinance sector. MF associations are uniquely positioned to compile data 
for creation of information – e. g. performance monitoring – that are barred to any 
other organisation. MF associations should be built around that objective and judged 
by it. Many interventions oscillate around partial issues of informational efficiency, e. 
g. credit reference and rating services. Yet, its conceptualisation has been curiously 
neglected by development partners. Consequently appreciation has been insufficient 
regarding the specific, impressive management demands faced by MF associations.  
These are the conclusions of over 2 years working with AMFIU.1 AMFIU, the 
microfinance association of Uganda, has been commended as one of the leading MF 
associations of Africa. AMFIU grew its membership and expanded its operations 
impressively. In its 12th year of existence, AMFIU membership represents about three 
quarter of the Ugandan microfinance sector in terms of portfolio and client outreach.  
The remainder of the paper organises as follows: Section two provides definitions of 
associations and apexes respectively. Section three outlines the regulation debate from 
Uganda 2005-2007 and draws the emerging lessons for MF associations. Section four 
                                                 
1  The author worked as AMFIU’s Technical Advisor from Feb. 2005 to Aug. 2007, seconded by German 
Development Cooperation (http://uganda.ded.de).  
introduces the concept of informational efficiency and discusses how MF associations 
can provide for it; with examples from AMFIU/Uganda. Section five concludes.  
2 Associations and Apexes: Definitions 
Umbrella organisations are best characterised by the relationship between umbrella and 
member. Although there are different roles and tasks, in the long run the most vibrant and 
resourceful umbrellas are those which are member-based, member-owned and member-
driven. Voluntary membership is a core characteristic of such umbrellas.  
Hinterhuber/Levin (1994) differentiate between horizontal and vertical networks. In 
vertical networks, the centre commands more authority, members are less independent, e. 
g. economically. This also implies that in vertical networks the interaction between 
members is less intensive than in horizontal networks. A quasi-vertical relationship 
between centre and de-facto independent members and low interaction between members 
is an indicator of a weak umbrella. Such a weakness can be over-come by two strategies: 
On the one hand, transforming the quasi-vertical into a real vertical network, i. e. availing 
the centre with "real" authority, e. g. legally mandated monitoring. On the other hand, 
removing the quasi-vertical properties and strengthening horizontality, e. g. interaction 
between members. Obviously, the centre is biased towards the former, while members 
are not organised (that is one cause for quasi-verticality) to demand for the latter. 
Unfortunately, development partners (funders), though verbally supporting the latter 
strategy, de facto drive towards the former, as their interventions regularly expand the 
scope of the centre.  
Membership means restricting independence or sovereignty. In a horizontal network this 
restriction is controlled by the member, i. e. it is self-restriction by (hopefully) conscious 
decision to commit to the membership. Economically, that implies paying membership-
fees; operationally, it might imply aligning to codes of conduct. Economic theory states 
that membership should always offer benefits exceeding costs, however the calculation of 
that depends heavily on the time horizon covered. Regularly, umbrellas have to mitigate 
short-term costs and long-term benefits. One important instrument is to offer short-term 
benefits to motivate members to bear short-term costs of long-term benefits. Membership 
is a package. The package may become un-manageable if membership is very 
heterogeneous and the mitigation task grows over-complex.  
Associations are formalised networks with a permanent, constituted structure. Regularly, 
associations develop into vertical networks, as permanent structures tend to harden and 
seek for expansion, following for instance the pattern discussed in the previous 
paragraph. However, formation of an association does not automatically imply that the 
concept of horizontal network is abandoned. On the contrary, merging permanent, 
constituted structures with horizontality offers an attractive blend of identity or common 
bond and operationality. This blend may sustain a positive feedback-circle, i. e. growth of 
the association.  
Apexes are associations with legally constituted roles, e. g. in monitoring of their 
members. Such roles regularly come with compulsory membership. Whereas associations 
are voluntary and there can be more than one association targeting the same task, apexes 
are usually monopolies which members are legally obliged to join. Apexes are member-
organisations as opposed to branch networks. However, they are not really member-based 
but law-based.  
“There is an underlying role conflict when a member-based organization regulates its members, 
but the deficiency of state control calls for self-regulation.… Taking over [supervisory power] 
transforms a self-regulator on behalf of members into a mandated regulator on behalf of 
government and consequently destroys the property of being member-based.” (AMFIU 2005, p. 
59)  
An apex may establish a strong bond among their members, and that is the intention of 
their constitution. But more often they become bureaucratic, rely on their compulsory 
authority and loose member-orientation.  
Member-drive demands a high level of horizontal interaction between centre and 
members and between members among themselves. The objectives, tasks and course of 
the umbrella shall be determined by these interactions, i. e. the centre is at service of and 
focusing on the members. The first management task of the umbrella, therefore, is to 
sustain the high level of interaction itself.  
3 The confusion about regulatory roles and public goods 
3.1 Case study: Which role for apexes in Ugandan MF regulation? 
After intensive political debate and a concerted advocacy campaign, the Ugandan 
parliament passed a Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions (MDI) bill in 2003. This 
bill created a niche ("tier 3") of regulated MFIs under the purview of the central bank. 
AMFIU's strongest profiling activity was to give platform and voice to the advocacy for 
the MDI-bill. There was a strong commercial motivation, as NGOs recognised that the 
transformation process would be a viable enterprise2, and it would provide a legal basis 
for their mobilising savings. Eventually, four NGO-MFIs, three of them with 
international roots, acquired a MDI-licence. They represent about 2 out of 6 Microfinance 
clients; 3 out of 6 Microfinance clients are accounted for by other regulated financial 
service providers ("tier 1 and 2"; mainly Centenary Bank). All regulated MFIs are 
AMFIU members. The “remaining” 1 out of 6 MF clients is serviced by about 90% of the 
                                                 
2  Indeed, it has been for the first round, judging by the huge amounts of financial resources channelled into 
it by various development partners (see e. g. Goodwin-Groen/Bruett/Latortue 2004). 
MFIs, the ultimate majority of them co-operatives, which remained unregulated ("tier 4"). 
Parliamentarians have been pressing for expanding the regulatory framework. After the 
general elections of 2005, with a new minister of state of microfinance in charge, the 
debate has been intensified and concretised. A Microfinance bill is being prepared, 
cabinet papers have been drafted.  
One of the issues of the debate is the role of umbrella organisations in the future 
regulatory framework. AMFIU and two cooperative umbrellas are considered for one role 
or another. GoU has pushed for a strong role of UCSCU – one of the two cooperative 
umbrellas – to be the exclusive apex of all SACCOs (savings and credit cooperatives) of 
Uganda, i. e. compulsory membership. Along the same lines, it has repeatedly proposed 
that non-cooperative MFIs and MDIs should be directed to affiliate with AMFIU. 
However, AMFIU and the two cooperative produced a statement that calls for strictly 
voluntary and thus non-exclusive membership (note that currently 41% of AMFIU MFI-
members are SACCOs). Naturally, that would restrict the role in regulation towards 
supportive, monitoring functions. Although AMFIU condensed these effects in a working 
paper (Baguma 2006), the ideas did not hold strongly among policy makers, neither 
development partners nor MoFPED. 
The discussion is still going on, but it has been noted that the voluntary nature of 
affiliation with umbrellas has very weak advocacy throughout the players. The drive is 
rather towards apexes, which GoU prefers to pass through their regulatory agenda, and 
umbrellas prefer (despite their statement) because it sustains their position without much 
effort towards their membership.  
3.2 Differentiating between Self-regulation and Mandated Regulation 
Even among development partners the differentiation between apex and umbrella and the 
arising issues are often not clear, and there is a tendency to see a regulatory role for them 
beyond limited monitoring (see e. g. Staschen 2006). Gross/Brüntrup (2003) identify 
norm setting as one of the main tasks of umbrella organisations. It transpires through 
rules, codes of conduct and self-regulation. Gross/Brüntrop (p. 52) clearly differentiate 
between adoption of rules by the umbrella and its members and the adoption of rules by 
government and its regulatory agencies.  
For self-adopted rules, the umbrella is mandated by the members to promote and monitor 
them through publishing standards such as codes of conducts, through awards for best 
practice, through performance tracking and benchmarking, which can be internal 
(individual performance monitoring report) and public (industry-wide consolidated 
performance monitoring report).  
For third-party-rules, namely government, the umbrella may be mandated by the third 
party to play a role in their implementation. This role can be limited, e. g. monitoring and 
compliance support, it can be chosen upon pre-defined requirements, e. g. an umbrella 
could build auditing capacities, and it can be exclusive, e. g. supervision powers 
appointed to the umbrella. The latter is regularly reflected in compulsory membership. 
However, mandated supervision comes with a fundamental transformation of character of 
an umbrella which is oftentimes overlooked (e. g. Staschen 2006). Mandated supervision 
turns the umbrella into a quasi-agency of government and shifts its allegiance from 
members to government (AMFIU 2005, see section 2). Mandated supervision makes an 
apex, where the ultimate decision lies with the mandating agency. Self-regulation and 
limited regulatory support roles make an association, where the last decision remains 
with the members, and if they feel the balance is not met, they can dispose of it.  
3.3 Do MF associations provide "public goods"? 
Tasks performed by MF umbrellas throughout Sub-Sahara-Africa are broadly categorised 
into service provision, norm setting and interest mediation. Gross/Brüntrup (pp. 65) 
reason that MF umbrellas deliver "public goods", for which regulatory tasks are taken to 
be a case in point. They even justify a financial sustainability concept for umbrellas that 
does not cover their full operational and financial costs by client-generated income but 
only cover their "core costs." However, Gross/Brüntrup remain surprisingly shadowy 
about what core activities and corresponding core costs are. De Boer (2007) has 
scrutinised the concept and defined three levels of core costs. While activity-related costs 
are subject to further discussion, probably everybody would agree that "the cost of 
keeping the office open" is at the core of core costs.  
The case for public goods is flawed. It rests on unsound concepts of regulatory roles – 
which have been straightened in the previous section. Otherwise, public goods are 
characterised by (i) variable costs near to zero, and (ii) high costs of excluding somebody 
from using the good in question (Schmidt 2005a). In as far as negligible variable costs are 
the concern, membership fees are the efficient pricing model of choice. As far as “free 
riding” is the concern, i. e. organisations profiting without contributing, it is the task of 
the association to create attractive packages of services which appeal to potential 
members.  
Surely, MF associations do have two, not one, important clientele. The first and foremost 
are naturally their member-MFIs. By joining (or not joining) the association and buying 
its "products", they signal if those "products" are packaged well. By participation in the 
packaging process, e. g. through AGM discussions or other horizontal exchange, client-
drive of the MF association's products should be ensured.  
The second important clientele are development partners, and maybe sometimes 
government agencies. If MF associations deliver on this market, they can close the gap 
between their aspirations and the resources wrought out of MFI-members. Moreover, 
development partner may be willing to finance some services to MFIs fully or partly, thus 
giving the association space of manoeuvre for attractive package pricing. On the same 
token, taking over a "job" from government, e. g. carrying out some monitoring, should 
be based on cost-covering remuneration. 
Summing up, it is strongly hold here that associations’ development partners should not 
operate on fuzzy "public-good-core-cost" approaches. Instead, they should enable 
umbrellas to be business partners that deliver defined products; and are paid upon 
delivery. By the nature of associations everywhere, they access public money. That does 
not make them unsustainable. The decisive factor should be the quality of product 
delivered for that money. An umbrella organisation has two major groups of clients: 
MFIs – as potential members – and development partners. It is from serving those clients 
that it should generate income to cover its costs.  
4 MF associations' competitive edge: Creating information 
4.1 Case Study: AMFIU - "information hub" of Ugandan Microfinance 
Industry?3 
AMFIU works to establish itself as a significant information broker for the Microfinance 
Industry. At the core of this role is a grand performance monitoring project. With a 
specific tool and corresponding database, performance data from MFIs shall be collected 
quarterly and consolidated into industry-reports on portfolio volumes, qualities and 
outreach. After the project has been going on for years (Schmidt 2005b), it is supposed to 
become operational in 2007. Also, it was found that consumers' informational needs are 
not met appropriately i. e. there is a great need for consumer education and transparency 
standards of MFIs. AMFIU has advocated for these among others through developing a 
Consumer Code of Practice which was signed by 40 MFIs including most bigger ones in 
2006 (AMFIU 2006). Along these lines, AMFIU also publishes annually a directory that 
displays contacts and basic business information of its members 
(Blatter/Mbabazi/Kumwesiga 2006). 
Experience shows that Ugandan MFIs are particularly weak in their information 
management. This appears to be the main reason for weak information sharing cultures. 
Whereas the element of concern about competition-relevant data may be there, the 
Ugandan rating project indicates that it is not too strong (see the information shared 
publicly under www.ratingfund.or.ug). Rather, it reflects weak MIS.  
Also, because AMFIU is permanent – as opposed to time-bound projects many 
development partners use – its database will eventually allow for time-series analysis. 
Furthermore, drawing on the trust-based relationship with their members combined with 
a peer-mechanism ("branding" of AMFIU-membership towards certain properties) allows 
                                                 
3 This section draws excerpts from Blatter/Schmidt (2007).  
convincing MFIs to implement certain levels of transparency which not only improve the 
systemic efficiency of the microfinance industry as a whole, but also allow AMFIU 
collecting further data.  
The latter argument has been a pretext to perceive "information dissemination" through 
the famous "public-goods"-lenses. Thus, the drive to understand and package it from a 
product/demand-perspective has been low; development partners have also rarely 
emphasised it, let alone provided active capacity building towards it. Instead, information 
is broadly subsidised, based on input-indicators such as books bought or printed.  
Therefore, although AMFIU has established competency in information provision to a 
certain degree, it is still to embrace fully the tasks entailed and to build the corresponding 
systems and capabilities. But AMFIU, and members and development partners alike, has 
not fully embraced yet what the informational role demands in terms of data collection 
systems, in terms of (mainly) electronic systems to store and process data, and in terms of 
"packaging" them to attract / reach the right stakeholder group. It is ultimately the last 
step that turns data into information. Of course it remains vain without the other two. 
4.2 Informational Efficiency of the MF sector 
Information is data turned into relevant input for decision-making. Data collection and 
processing is costly and demands specialised functions and systems. These can and 
should apply both on the demand and on the supply side. Suppliers depend on generating 
management information to be successful – i. e. to know sales trends, main customer 
characteristics, product qualities, production cycles and time frames, supply chain 
properties. Consumers may buy products without much querying. Indeed low quality-
segments exist for probably every product one may think of. However, in a balanced 
assessment of consumer interest, they at least want to know the qualities to choose from, 
and which difference they make to them. In a market with high informational efficiency, 
an array of product properties will be displayed and be compared by consumers, giving 
rise to support facilities, e. g. specialised magazines (e. g. about buying a kitchen or 
organising a weeding) and consumer protection organisations.  
With regard to microfinance, MFIs have ever been struggling to set up and eventually 
computerise4 MIS for data collection, storage and analysis. The main focus of 
development support – "capacity building" – has been here. Comparably little efforts 
have been made to improve consumers capacity to access data. The Consumer Education 
programme of AMFIU, DFID and FSDU in Uganda is one exception (Schmidt 2006). 
Recently, the interest in the demand side of microfinance appears to be on the rise among 
development partners.   
                                                 
4  Many MFI-representatives belief that computerisation equals setting up of systems. However, that is not 
the case, as the well-known GiGa-adage regarding computers shows (GiGa = garbage in, garbage out).  
Yet, data collection is only one side of it. Turning it into information by competently 
storing and processing it and by disseminating it in relevant formats to the right 
stakeholders is another task of its own. This is very obvious for consumers, as they 
usually do not refer to "raw data" but are provided with "information", i. e. data packaged 
in a way that relates to their choices. Examples are displays of effective interest rates 
and/or total costs which consolidate data on nominal interest rates and the various fees 
applicable. Check lists how to identify a sound MFI are another information package that 
condenses data analysis done by experts.  
Even if MIS capacity is given, MFIs will be very careful in giving out what they have, 
because they may regard it as competitively significant or damaging if shared with 
regulatory authorities or the public. A membership organisation appears to be ideally 
positioned as it has an idiosyncratic trust-based relationship to its members. That allows 
creating an atmosphere whereby even competitively significant data is shared as the 
association will render it anonymous and yet be able to present consolidated information 
that each of the MFIs alone would not be able to access. Thus, umbrella associations have 
a great potential as producers and providers of information. It is here that they have a 
competitive edge over all other organisations.  
4.3 Conceptualising Informational Efficiency of the MF sector 
Like any statement about efficiency, informational efficiency is a judgement against a 
chosen benchmark. This benchmark should establish baseline indicators that answer the 
five questions:  
1)  Which information should reasonably be available in a given rhythm to senior 
managers, to board members, to policy makers, to staff and to customers? 
2)  Which information should minimally be available in a given rhythm to senior 
managers, to board members, to policy makers to staff and to customers? 
3)  Which data is necessary to generate the minimum and the reasonable level of 
information? 
4)  How systematically is that data generated, collected, stored and processed? 
5)  What costs does each target groups incur to access the minimum information? 
Information is a different thing to different people. However, for board and management 
of MFIs, a basic set of information can be thought off that looks at a scorecard of 
profitability, clients/members, staff and systems. Table 1 proposes the reasonable and the 
minimal information levels for these four perspectives. Though drawing on usual sound 
practices, this is by no means a dogmatic selection – surely various practitioners would 
follow different priorities. The life cycle of the MF sector in question and practical 
considerations – there are usually budget restrictions to the scope of indicators – will 
come into play as well. Consequently, they may formulate the goal for informational 
efficiency differently, and assess corresponding activities differently. Note however that 
this selection concentrates on board and management. Assumingly, for policy makers, 
consumers and even staff, the range of information considered relevant will be more 
diverse, depending on the philosophical approaches held to be true.  
Information depends on data available and the knowledge to relate the data (analyse). 
Knowledge is not easy to track and even harder to influence, hardly at all in the short run. 
While overall knowledge levels should be a serious concern of policy makers, in 
particular with regard to educational system and training capacities available, 
development agencies and umbrella organisations are well advised to concentrate on the 
measurable and operational targets. I. e., they should set-up and run systems to collect 
relevant data and provide it in a meaningful manner.  
Table 1: Information efficiency for board and management 
 Profitability Clients/ Members Staff Systems 
Reasonable 
Information 
level 
How profitable 
are my 
products? 
How profitable 
are my 
branches? 
How are my 
clients/members 
satisfied; which needs 
are not yet met? 
How is my relative (with 
regard to peers) growth 
performance? 
How do my staff's 
skills meet the 
needs, where are 
gaps? 
How is my staff 
paid relative to 
competitors? 
How is the security 
standard of my 
systems? 
How do my systems 
impact on my 
profitability? 
Minimum 
Information 
level 
Is my quarterly 
surplus 
positive? 
Are my profits 
growing? 
Is the number of active 
clients/ members 
growing? 
Does a client/member 
wait for disbursement of 
a loan / withdrawal of 
savings longer or shorter 
than at my competitors'? 
Is portfolio quality 
calculated correctly 
and regularly? 
Does field staff 
pass on all relevant 
information to 
clients/members? 
Do my procedures 
ensure sound security 
of cash and assets? 
Do I produce an 
accurate quarterly 
balance sheet and 
income/loss 
statement? 
Note that this scorecard cannot be satisfied by one MFI on its own. Rather it needs a 
collaborative effort to compile meaningful benchmarks. In table 1, the obviously 
comparative indicators are put in italics; but comparative perspectives will enrich most of 
the others as well. 
With regard to the information benchmarks proposed in table 1, the arising data needs 
can be established as given in table 2. Based on these or comparable lists of information 
benchmarks and corresponding data to be collected, the current level of information 
efficiency can be quantified. Critical is that the assessment is oriented on actual 
generation, not on intentions or other declaratory statements. It may be found that pre-
defined standards exist as off-the-shelf-documents, and consequently they are on-the- 
Table 2: Data necessary to establish information levels as of table one 
 Profitability Clients/ Members Staff Systems 
Data 
necess
ary for 
reason
able 
Inform
ation 
level 
Sales (no. of 
clients, volume of 
loans/ savings) per 
product for a given 
period (month, 
quarter) 
Variable product 
cost 
Fixed product and 
other overhead cost 
Sales (no. of 
clients, volume of 
loans/savings) per 
branch for a given 
period (month, 
quarter) 
Variable branch 
cost 
Fixed branch cost 
Ratio of client retention (per 
product) 
No of products per client 
Client drop-out after 
successfully serving a loan 
product 
Demand for products other 
than the one's at offer 
Variance of product range 
towards peers  
Level of staff skills, based 
on standardised assessment 
Change of level of staff 
skills 
Ratio of staff costs to 
variable and fixed costs 
(per product, per branch)  
Average salary for branch 
managers, loans officers 
throughout the industry 
Ratio salary to average rent 
at the location of 
deployment 
Pre-defined standards 
for electronic 
systems, lending to 
board and staff 
members  
No of working hours 
lost per month 
because of computer 
constraints  
Pre-defined quality of 
reports (balance 
sheet, income/loss 
statement, portfolio 
report, salary 
processing) 
No of complaints 
from clients about 
products (e. g. wrong 
postings etc) 
Data 
necess
ary for 
minim
um 
Inform
ation 
level 
Pre-defined 
standard to 
calculate income 
and loss 
Quarterly 
income/loss 
statement 
Trend-chart of 
quarterly profits 
Trend chart of no of active 
loan clients 
Trend chart of new members 
(paid up) quarterly 
Trend chart of active savings 
clients 
Date of loan application, date 
of loan disbursement, 
Average Period between 
application and disbursement 
(quarterly) 
Pre-defined standard of 
portfolio reporting 
Trend chart of PAR30 
quarterly 
Pre-defined standard of 
information to be 
communicated to clients 
No of clients/members 
found to be falling short of 
standard (upon checking 
groups by supervisors) 
Pre-defined standard 
of cash handling 
Pre-defined standard 
of liability and asset 
handling 
Pre-defined 
monitoring 
procedures to ensure 
those standards 
Chart of accounts 
Quarterly balancing 
Shelf-documents but do not drive daily operations. Furthermore, small institutions 
regularly have managers that are really only first secretaries. A manager should actively 
watch out for some of the issues touched on in tables one and two. That is often not the 
case, rather the staff do not take responsibility (i. e. do not seek information) and often 
are not aware of the basic data needs or data generation standards. Yet, the staff 
perspective is regularly neglected in Microfinance Institutions, and therefore insufficient 
attempts to assess or develop staff capacities are made. If the reason given is that the 
institution is too small to employ quality staff, then an attempt by board-members to 
close that gap should be recognisable. Assessing the information costs that target groups 
incur, it is important not only to look at monetary payments, but also at time necessary to 
generate information, and at risk they take by neglecting information.  
4.4 Building organisational capacity of the umbrella 
Informational Efficiency is a property of the sector. It is in the best interest of sound-
practice MFIs to improve it steadily, but none of them can do it alone. A MF association 
is potentially ideally positioned to look after it. Its success will depend on setting up 
adequate systems. These systems are principally different from MFIs where MF 
association managers have usually earned their merits. MF associations need a 
membership management system, a product development system which links all 
activities to the long term goals. Eventually, standard business processes for MF 
associations need to be laid down.   
Membership management 
The basic indicator is naturally membership. Members are the main client group of 
umbrellas – the other one being development partners. The umbrella should as a 
minimum have a system in place that in a given rhythm – at least twice a year – 
establishes number of members and proportion paid-up, number of members recruited in 
reporting period, number of members dropped out (and for what reason). To the 
background of understanding of umbrellas in Europe, development agencies tend to take 
such information for granted. But it is not. Thus, development agencies are regularly 
working with umbrellas that have only a rough picture of their membership – most 
importantly, only a rough picture of the membership trends. The indicator needs to be 
tracked seriously by both board and management of the umbrella, and development 
partners need to identify and address the capacity building necessary to do so. Once a 
membership database is established and managed well, it will allow tracking of 
interaction of the members with the secretariat, e. g. which publications members took, 
which activities they participated in, which data they submitted.  
Product portfolio: Information first 
Associations get engaged in a wide range of services. It is hold here that the first and 
foremost engagement should be data and information brokerage. In any case, the range of 
services should be looked at regularly, and it should be kept narrow. It must be clearly 
understood that this is only possible if development partners are deliberately cautious 
with suggesting new tasks to the association. Otherwise, the association is unlikely to 
develop a culture of cautiously tapping into new areas. Whenever they do so, it should 
always be to the background of a firm standing in the areas it is already active in. New 
areas should not dilute but build on reputation and strengths gained in the current area. 
From this transpires the call for clear priorities in the association's service (product) port- 
Figure 1: Indicator System for Microfinance associations 
 
1 Recommended to be "Information Collection and Dissemination". 
2 Demands building the corresponding database and capacity of staff and board to 
apply it. 
3 For each activity area, SMART objectives are to be defined. Examples for the area 
"informational efficiency of the microfinance market" are given in chapter 7.1. These 
can be measured applying a scale, e. g. 0 to 10. This allows assessing feasibility of 
expanding main activity areas. The product manual could regulate thresholds for each 
main activity area to be pre-requisite of expanding into new ones.  
folio. However, because umbrellas are relatively unknown types of organisations, and 
draw their staff from organisations of different type – usually members or other 
stakeholders – the product portfolio is regularly poorly defined. Just as an umbrella has to 
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have a robust membership database, it has to have a manual on product development 
(including roles of management, board and general assembly in that process), costing and 
pricing as the basis for delivering products to its own members and other target groups 
(usually development partners).  
Linking MF association’s performance to informational efficiency of the sector 
From the point of view taken throughout this paper, products of a microfinance 
association should evolve around informational efficiency of their microfinance industry. 
I. e., the quality of service delivery should be tracked through the indicators of 
informational efficiency discussed in the previous chapter. Figure 1 consolidates these 
considerations in one tool. 
Figure 2: 6 Main Assessment Areas of SEEP Network’s NCAT 
Governance Operations Financial Viability
HR External Relations Service Delivery
 
Source: SEEP (2006), own presentation. 
Besides focussing the association on its economically defined relevancy, rather than 
"NGOing", this concept also gives advocacy and lobbying its place without referring to 
"public good" reasoning. Informational efficiency of a market will always depend on the 
institutional setting that is highly though by no means exclusively shaped by government 
agencies. Informational efficiency will be influenced by the way government  
-  demands standards of accounting and staffing, 
-  sets (other) transparency requirements, starting with the legal statutes applicable to 
MFIs,  
-  intervenes in price setting and service delivery processes, 
-  encourages long term investment and growth strategies.  
Some or all of these will reflect in the previously discussed indicators (table 1, 2). For 
example, government may or may not determine the chart of accounts, and related to that 
the auditing standards for MFIs. Government may or may not demand MFIs to report 
various figures, among others effective costs of products. Obviously, the more 
governments make such claims, and the more effective governments implement them, the 
more will MFIs be willing to invest accordingly, and thus to join and collaborate with 
associations who implement such. Thus, as informational efficiency of a microfinance 
market is tracked, the effectiveness of advocacy activities is measured as well. 
Figure 3: AMFIU-process “Processing of incoming requests” 
 
*  Referred processes (3 – Provide Information, 4 – Document Front Desk Interactions) are 
documented in AMFIU (2007). 
Source AMFIU (2007). 
Excurse: Standard Business Processes for MF associations 
The challenges of ensuring basic functionality stem from the lack of conceptualisations of 
business processes for umbrella organisations. Consequently, umbrella organisation 
managers have practically no benchmarks for the internal organisation of their staff and 
workflow. In that regard, managing an umbrella organisation is a more demanding job 
than managing a NGO or MFI. The latter can be easily assessed against their peers and 
against the own experience background. Apparently, many development agencies are 
hardly aware of this gap, rather take such standard business processes for granted, on the 
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same note as they assume the existence of reliable membership management systems. 
One of the few tools available is the The SEEP Network’s „Network Capacity 
Assessment Tool (NCAT)”. It was conceptualised in a broad participatory process and is 
applied in its fourth version all around the world (SEEP 2006). It defines standards of 
network effectiveness in the areas governance, operations, financial viability, HR, 
External Relations and Service Delivery. SEEP Members assess each other using a 
detailed list of weighted criteria which fall in the six areas (figure 2). The NCAT 
emphasises business processes in that operations and service delivery take 32% of the 
score. However, the process perspective is not explicitly addressed. A comprehensive 
concept for that has not been popularised so far. AMFIU has started to develop it for 
some areas; an example is presented in figure 3.  
Another scarcely operationalised perspective is that of the organisational life cycle. Yet, 
it would provide an important point of reference for capacity building. Not last, it helps in 
comparing different networks. Again, SEEP-Network’s NCAT stands out in that its 
rating has an inbuilt reference to four stages of the organisational life cycle, namely 
nascence, emergence, expansion and maturity (SEEP 2006). Also, the Dutch 
Development Organisation SNV in Uganda used to refer to the life cycle perspective in 
supporting its local partner organisations (many of which are umbrellas). Documentation 
of any organisation’s history is surely a good starting point. Ideally, a regular gap 
analysis based on a life cycle model should be applied. Also, manuals of umbrella 
organisations should refer to the stage of its life cycle, processes be expected to work 
more sophisticatedly, and management be assessed more demandingly to that end.  
However, altogether both the business process and the life cycle perspective of umbrellas 
remain to be studied more and transformed into management applications. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Throughout Sub-Sahara-Africa, MF associations have been nurtured by development 
partners; including since 2000 an association of associations (www.afmin.org). 
Gross/Brüntrop (p. 56) stress that the variety of services catered by umbrella 
organisations are "extremely diverse in nature". This is accounted to the low development 
level of the microfinance sectors and corresponding lack of providers to meet various 
microfinance-service-related demands from MFIs and/or consumers (p. 6/7).  
It is argued here that it is high time to tighten the conceptual and ultimately the 
programmatic grip of development agencies intervening into MF associations. More so as 
practically all umbrellas are heavily supported by (the same) donors (Gross/Brüntrup p. 
18-21, also pp. 71). Henceforth, development partners should base their support to MF 
associations on their outstanding economic edge which is informational efficiency. 
Development partners are challenged to build specific skills – advocacy, electronic data 
management, public relations and communication – and corresponding systems of 
associations. This has hardly been the case in the past. Development partners and MF 
association practitioners alike are challenged to abstain from "dumping" a diverse array 
of tasks onto the umbrellas. Moreover, they are to withstand seduction of regulatory roles 
– a seduction which sometimes comes with a promise of government funding and 
staffing. But be aware: Government is just using the association as a shortcut, diverting 
attention from its own responsibilities; at the end of the day, the promises will turn out to 
be without substance, but prior substance of the association will have been destroyed.  
AMFIU and other MF associations throughout Africa deserve support. They carry the 
potential to contribute significantly to vibrant MF sectors in particular and strong private 
markets in general. If this potential is unleashed, the decade-odd experience of 
development support to MF associations will pay off.  
References 
AMFIU (2005): Sound Practices in Microfinance – A Compilation of International and Ugandan Good Practices 
for Microfinance Stakeholders, Kampala.  
AMFIU (2006): On course for Transparency: 40 MFIs commit themselves, in: The Microfinance Banker, 2/2006, p. 
24/25. 
AMFIU (2007): Manual Front Desk Processes (draft), Kampala (internal document). 
Baguma, David T. (2006): Self-regulation of Tier 4 Microfinance Institutions: AMFIU’s Perspective, AMFIU 
Working Paper No. 3, Kampala. 
Blatter, Robert / Mbabazi, Jacqueline / Kumwesiga, Carol T. (2006): The State of Microfinance in Uganda - 
Analysing AMFIU members, AMFIU Working Paper No. 5, Kampala. 
Blatter, Robert / Schmidt, Oliver (2007): Do associations impact on growth? – The case of the Association of 
Microfinance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU), in: Africa Yearbook 2007, Bremen. 
De Boer, Hasse (2007): Evaluation of AMFIU – Final Report, funded by GoU/EU’s SUFFICE-programme, 
Kampala (unpublished). 
Goodwin-Gren, R. / Bruett, T. / Latortue, A. (2004): Uganda Microfinance Sector Effectiveness Review, CGAP, 
Wasshington D. C. 
Gross, Roland / Brüntrup, Michael (2003): Microfinance Associations (MFA) – Their Role in Developing the 
Microfinance Sector, GTZ – Division 41, Eschborn. 
Hinterhuber, H. H. / Levin, B. M. (1994): Strategic Networks – The Organisation of the Future, in: Long Range 
Planning, 27, 3, S. 43-53.  
Schmidt, Oliver (2005a): Ein Leuchtturm für die Wirtschaftswissenschaften, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 85. Jahrgang, 
Februar 2005, S. 126ff. 
Schmidt, Oliver (2005b): Employing AMFIU's PMT: Experiences and expectations – Analysis of the results of 
the PMT-survey carried out in March 2005, AMFIU Working Paper No. 1,Kampala. 
Schmidt, Oliver (2006): Do Microfinance Development Strategies care about the consumer? – Assessing 
Microfinance trends and drivers upon the case of Uganda, in: Info-CD "Microfinance", ded Fachreferat P12, 
September 2006, Bonn. 
SEEP (2004): Global Directory of Regional and Country Level Microfinance Networks, Washington D. C.  
SEEP (2006): Network Capacity Assessment Tool (NCAT) - Assessing the Organizational Capacities of 
Microenterprise Development Networks, Version 4.0 (January 2006), Washington D. C. 
Staschen, Stefan (2006): Possible Mechanisms to Regulate Tier 4 MFIs in Uganda, with Michael Akumpiria, in: 
AMFIU (2006): Regulating and Strengthening Tier 4 Microfinance Institutions in Uganda: Background 
Studies, compiled by the Tier 4 Technical Working Subcommittee, Microfinance Forum, Kampala, p. 62-97.  
